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Abstract
Mezzeti and Dinopoulos (1991) show that a free trade agreement (trade liberalization)
decreases wage rate. However, Naylor (1998) shows that trade liberalization increases wage
rate. Both papers consider tariﬀ as exogenously given. In this paper we show that these
conﬂicting results can be nested into a model of international duopoly with a more general
wage bargaining structure. Tariﬀ is endogenously determined in our model. In addition,
we also derive crucial implications of the wage bargaining structure on the sustainability of
trade liberalization.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Mezzeti and Dinopoulos (1991), using a Cournot international duopoly model with a domestic
unionized ﬁrm and a foreign non-unionized ﬁrm, suggest that a free trade agreement (trade
liberalization) decreases wage rate. However, Naylor (1998), using a Cournot international
duopoly model with domestic and foreign unionized ﬁrms, shows that trade liberalization in-
creases wage rate. Both papers consider tariﬀ as exogenously given. In this paper we show
that these conﬂicting results can be nested into a model of international duopoly with a more
general wage bargaining structure. Tariﬀ is endogenously determined in our model.
Further, this paper demonstrates that the union bargaining structure has important impli-
cations on the sustainability of trade liberalization. More speciﬁcally, we show that when the
domestic and foreign labor markets are unionized (as in Naylor’s model), the range of discount
factors that support a free trade agreement is wider than when they are not unionized. This
implies that it is easier for countries to form a free trade agreement when they have unionized
labor markets. However, each country’s welfare and the world welfare are lower when labor
markets are unionized than when they are not unionized. Evidently, this generates a trade-oﬀ
between sustaining a free trade agreement and maximizing welfare gains from it. If both coun-
tries’ goal is to attain the highest welfare possible, then having a non unionized labor market
would help countries achieving that goal. Unfortunately, it would make the free trade agreement
harder to sustain. To the best of our knowledge, this is a new result in the literature.
We also show that in the case of asymmetric labor market bargaining structure in which only
the domestic ﬁrm is unionized (as in Mezzeti-Dinopoulo’s model), it is diﬃcult for countries
to sign a free trade agreement. This is because the unionized domestic country experiences a
lower welfare under the free trade regime than under the tariﬀ regime. The only way to sustain
the free trade agreement in this particular case is to have the foreign country compensates the
domestic country for the welfare losses resulted from the adoption of the free trade regime.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model, and in
section 3 we analyze the results. Then, we discuss the role of the labor market bargaining
structure in sustaining a free trade agreement in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 The model
There are two countries indexed by i ∈ (1,2). We label country 1 and 2 as respectively domestic
country and foreign country. Each country has one ﬁrm and one labor union representing its
workers. Firms produce a homogenous goods and compete in both markets. In the case of
export, ﬁrm i pays tariﬀ of tj (i 6= j) per unit of exports. The inverse market-demand function
2is linear in the form of;
p1 =1 − x − y (1)
p2 =1 − u − v (2)
where pi is country i’s market price; x and v are quantities sold by ﬁrm 1 in country 1 and 2
respectively; and y and u are quantities sold by ﬁrm 2 in country 1 and 2 respectively. Labors
are needed in the production of the goods. We assume that the technology exhibits a one-to-one
relationship between output and labor, i.e., l1 = x+u and l2 = v+y. The wage rate is denoted
by wi. Other than labor costs there are no costs incurred in the production process. A labor
union in a country concerns about the total wage, liwi, received by its members, where li is
ﬁrm i’s derived demand for labor. The labor union and the ﬁrm in a country bargain over wage
only.1 For simplicity, we normalize the disagreement payoﬀs to zero.2
T h es e q u e n c eo fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s . I ns t a g e1, under an optimal tariﬀ regime, each
government sets its tariﬀ (ti) to maximize its national welfare, whereas under a free trade
regime, both governments agree to set a zero tariﬀ. In stage 2, the union and the ﬁrm in each
country bargain over wage (wi). Finally, in stage 3, ﬁrms compete in a Cournot fashion and set
their optimal outputs (x, y, u and v). We solve the game using backward induction.
Stage 3
Firms’ proﬁts are;
π1 = x(1 − x − y − w1)+u(1 − u − v − w1 − t2) (3)
π2 = v(1 − u − v − w2)+y(1 − x − y − w2 − t1) (4)
Cournot-Nash quantities can be derived as; x = 1
3(1−2w1+w2+t1); u = 1
3(1−2w1+w2−2t2);
v = 1
3(1 − 2w2 + w1 + t2);a n dy = 1
3(1 − 2w2 + w1 − 2t1). Hence, proﬁts of both ﬁrms can be
simpliﬁed into π1 = x2 + u2 and π2 = v2 + y2.
Stage 2 The wage bargaining process between a union and a ﬁrm follows a generalized







,where βi ∈ [0,1] indicates the bargaining power of the labor union in country i.I ti so b v i o u s
that the case of βi =0is equivalent to the case of non-unionized labor market.
1There are two modelling approaches on the union bargaining. The ﬁrst approach assumes that unions and
ﬁrms bargain over the wage and then ﬁrms respond by determining employment according to their labor demand
function. The second approach assumes that unions and ﬁrms bargain over the wage and employment. Layard
et al. (1991) argue that bargaining over employments is rarely observed and hence it is not quite realistic to be
used as a modelling approach. Furthermore, they also show that the wage rate determined under the employment
bargaining model will eventually approach the wage rate determined under the wage bargaining model. For these
reasons, in this paper we use the wage bargaining approach.
2In an earlier version of the paper, we consider a positive outside option. Unfortunately, such a consideration
made the analysis overly complicated without adding new insights.
3Stage 1 Under a free trade regime, each government sets a zero tariﬀ, ti =0 .U n d e ra n
optimal tariﬀ regime, each government sets ti to maximize its welfare. We deﬁne country i’s
national welfare, Wi, as the sum of consumers’ surplus, the producer’s surplus, the union’s total




(1 − pi)Qi + πi + liwi + tiqi (6)
,where Qi denotes total outputs in country i (Qi = x+y if i =1 ,a n dQi = u+v if i =2 ), and
qi denotes imports (qi = y if i =1 ,a n dqi = u if i =2 ).
3R e s u l t s a n d A n a l y s i s
Solving the maximization problem at stage 2 for all possible values of βi ∈ [0,1] yields overly
complicated high-order polynomials wage reaction-functions. Therefore, without loss of gen-
erality and in order to simplify the analysis, we focus on the following three most interesting
cases.
Case 1 Unionized Labor Markets (β1 = β2 =1 )
Case 2 Non-Unionized Labor Markets (β1 = β2 =0 )
Case 3 Unionized Domestic Labor Market and Non-Unionized Foreign Labor Market (β1 =1 ,
β2 =0 ).
Note that case 1 is similar to the one analyzed by Naylor (1998), whereas case 3 is similar
to the one analyzed by Mezzeti and Dinopoulous (1991). The case of β1 =0and β2 =1is the
mirror image of case 3, hence it suﬃces to focus only on case 3. Table 1 summarizes all results.3
The Optimal Tariﬀ Regime T h eF r e eT r a d eR e g i m e
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
t1 0.26 0.33 0.36 0 0 0
t2 0.26 0.33 0.22 0 0 0
w1 0.29 0 0.24 0.33 0 0
w2 0.29 0 0 0.33 0 0
x 0.32 0.44 0.29 0.22 0.33 0.17
u 0.06 0.11 0.25 0.22 0.33 0.17
v 0.32 0.44 0.49 0.22 0.33 0.42
y 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.22 0.33 0.42
W1 0.31 0.40 0.33 0.35 0.44 0.31
W2 0.31 0.40 0.41 0.35 0.44 0.52
W1 + W2 0.62 0.80 0.74 0.70 0.88 0.82
Table 1: Equilibrium Results
3The complete derivations of results can be obtained from us upon request.
4Proposition 1 (a) Moving from the case of non-unionized labor markets to the case of union-
ized labor markets increases w1 and w2;a n dd e c r e a s e st1 and t2 (b) Moving from the
case of non-unionized labor market to the case of unionized domestic labor market and
non unionized foreign labor market increases both w1 and t1 and decreases t2. However,
it does not change w2.
The intuition for the decrease in tariﬀ levels in point (a) is quite straightforward. When
labor markets become unionized, ﬁrms’ labor costs increase. Firms will then reduce their output.
This leads to a higher price of the goods and lower ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Obviously, the consumers’
surplus decreases. By reducing the tariﬀ barrier imposed on the foreign exporter, governments
can oﬀset the increase in the domestic price and improve the consumers’ surplus.
The intuition for point (b) is also straightforward. Here, the foreign ﬁrm does not face
any labor cost pressure, instead the domestic ﬁrm does. Consequently, the foreign ﬁrm can
increase its output sold in both domestic and export markets, whereas the domestic ﬁrm faces
ad i ﬃculty in doing so. Since the volume of foreign imports increases, the domestic welfare can
be further boosted by increasing the tariﬀ level imposed on the foreign ﬁrm. This enables the
domestic country to enjoy higher terms of trade gains. Meanwhile, the foreign country whose
labor market is non-unionized can further lower its tariﬀ barrier in order to attract more exports
from the domestic ﬁrm and thus to gain higher tariﬀ revenues.
By comparing the optimal tariﬀ regime and the free trade regime (the trade liberalization
regime), it can be seen that the impacts of a trade liberalization on wages are not necessarily
t h es a m ei nc a s e1a n dc a s e3 .I nc a s e1at r a d el i b e r a l i z a t i o nl e a d st oaw a g ei n c r e a s e ,w h i l e
in case 3 a trade liberalization leads to a decrease in the country 1’s wage and no change in
country 2’s wage. The former result is equivalent to that of Naylor (1998), while the latter
is equivalent to that of Mezzeti and Dinopoulos (1991). Our analysis thus shows that both
conﬂicting results can be nested in our model which has a more generalized union bargaining
structure. In addition to our previous result, we also have the following result.
Proposition 2 (a) As long as countries are symmetric in terms of the union bargaining power,
the world welfare is higher under the free trade regime than under the optimal tariﬀ regime,
regardless of the bargaining strength of labor unions. (b) However, if countries are asym-
metric, i.e. β1 =1and β2 =0 , then country 1’s welfare is smaller and country 2’s welfare
is higher under the free trade regime than under the optimal tariﬀ regime.
As is conventionally accepted, a free trade regime usually increases the aggregate welfare
level. However, in case 3 above the domestic country with the unionized labor market suﬀers
welfare losses when it moves from the optimal tariﬀ regime to the free trade regime. The main
reason is that the loss in the ﬁrm’s proﬁts due to the presence of unionization is exacerbated
by the terms of trade deterioration brought about by the free trade regime. The results clearly
5point out that when countries are asymmetric in terms of the labor market bargaining structure,
it is hard to sustain a free trade agreement between the two countries, even if they know that
the free trade regime may increase the world welfare as a whole. To facilitate and sustain the
agreement, the foreign country needs to compensate the domestic country for the welfare losses.
4 The Sustainability of a Free Trade Agreement
Proposition 2 shows that there is indeed an important relationship between the labor market
bargaining structure and trade liberalization. In a static setting it is known that sustaining a free
trade agreement is diﬃcult because a country may be tempted to deviate from the agreement
at the expense of the other country. However, in a repeated setting it is possible to ﬁnd a
condition for which a free trade agreement is sustainable. The following section analyzes such
an environment.
We focus on cases 1 and 2, in which a free trade agreement is mutually beneﬁcial for both
countries. Denote a country’s gains and losses from a deviation by respectively,
G(β1,β2)=W1(t1;0| β1,β2) − W
f
1 (0;0 | β1,β2)
L(β1,β2)=W
f
1 (0;0 | β1,β2)− W1(t1;t2 | β1,β2)
We assume that the punishment scheme for a deviation follows the grim trigger-strategy.T h u s ,
when a country deviates, there will be a retaliation that lasts forever by the other country.
Since the model is symmetric, the result for country 1 applies to country 2 as well. Here t1 and





This condition implies that the gains from a deviation should not exceed the losses from a
retaliation by the other country. Note that λ ∈ [0,1] represents countries’ time preference (or
discount factor). Solving for λ enables us to derive the threshold level of the discount factor
that will sustain the free trade agreement. The threshold values under cases 1 and 2 can be
straightforwardly derived as respectively, λcase 1 ≥ 0.43 and λcase 2 ≥ 0.56.4
It is obvious that when labor markets become unionized, it is easier for both countries to
sustain the free trade agreement. There will be a wider range of the discount factors that
can sustain the free trade agreement. This is because as labor markets become unionized,
the optimal tariﬀ levels decrease (see Proposition 1). Hence, the relative size of gains from a
deviation decreases, which implies that the threshold of the discount factor that sustains the
free trade agreement becomes smaller. However, the resulting world welfare and both countries’
4We also analyzed the case of β1 = β2 = 1
2. After some tedious numerical analysis using Mathemathica, we
obtain λ =0 .46 as the corresponding threshold value of the discount factor. The complete derivation is available
upon request. This result seems to suggest that the threshold of the discount factor is decreasing in the strength
of labor unions’ bargaining power
6welfare will be smaller when labor markets are unionized (see Proposition 2). The following
proposition summarizes our result.
Proposition 3 As long as countries are symmetric in terms of the union bargaining power, it
is relatively easier for countries to sustain a free trade agreement when labor markets are
unionized than when they are not unionized. However, the resulting welfare when labor
markets are unionized is smaller than when they are not unionized.
Thus, there is a trade-oﬀ for both countries. On the one hand, in order to facilitate an easier
formation of a free trade agreement, it is better for countries to have a unionized labor market.
On the other hand, however, both countries’ welfare will be smaller when labor markets are
unionized than when they are not unionized.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper analyzes the relationship between the labor market bargaining structure and trade
liberalization. We ﬁrst investigate the impact of trade liberalization on wage rate. In the
literature, there are two conﬂicting views on it. Mezzetti and Dinopolous (1991) argue that
trade liberalization decreases wage rate, whereas Naylor (1998) argues that trade liberalization
increases wage rate. We show that these two conﬂicting results can be nested into a model
of international duopoly with a more general wage bargaining structure. Furthermore and
more importantly, using our model we investigate the relationship between the labor market
bargaining structure and the sustainability of trade liberalization, i.e. a free trade agreement.
We show that it is easier to sustain a free trade agreement when labor markets in both countries
are unionized then when they are not unionized. However, each country’s welfare under the
former is lower than under the latter. This generates a trade-oﬀ between sustaining a free trade
agreement and maximizing welfare.
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